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It ain’t what you do, it’s the way that you do it: Characteristics of 
procedural justice and their importance in social decision-making 
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Abstract 
Standard welfare economic analysis evaluates all actions by their consequences.  
However, evidence from other disciplines suggests that the procedures by which 
decisions are made also affects the welfare of individuals.  This paper outlines six 
characteristics on which judgements about procedural justice may be based.  Using the 
example of health care rationing, we examine the importance of each characteristic using 
qualitative and quantitative methods.  We further consider the importance of each of 
these characteristics relative to one another and examine whether they are important for 
consequential or non-consequential reasons.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
At the heart of standard welfare economic theory lays utilitarianism, a philosophy that 
requires that every choice must ultimately be judged by the consequent states of affairs.  
Within economics more generally, this consequentialist foundation has traditionally been 
applied in a narrow sense, whereby only the impact on the utility associated with 
different possible outcomes is considered.  This narrow consequentialist approach does 
not, for example, consider any utility that might be generated from the ways in which 
alternative states of the world are determined.  Insofar as the procedures used to make 
decisions matter, they are valuable only to the extent to which they promote utility-
yielding outcomes. 
 
There has been increasing recognition that economics should develop a wider conception 
of utility that includes considerations besides consequences.  Hahn (1982, 188), for 
example, in describing the utility generated from alternative policy decisions, states that: 
“My utility may not only depend on what I get but on the manner in which I get it.  That 
is my utility may not only depend on the consequences of policy but on the policy itself.”  
Similarly, Ng (1988, 217) argues that: “if people prefer one-person-one-vote, the use of 
this method directly yields utility.  This is a fact that cannot be ignored.”  Some of the 
most conspicuous criticisms of the exclusion of procedural considerations have been 
made by Amartya Sen (Sen and Williams 1982, Sen 1997, Sen 2002), who argues that the 
failure to acknowledge procedural preferences may lead to biases in the ranking of 
policies.  
 
There is now empirical evidence that suggests that the ways in which decisions are made, 
and the reasons that underlie them, can affect people’s reactions to, and utility from, 
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those decisions.  Kahneman et al. (1986) presented members of the public with a range 
of hypothetical scenarios where the price of a commodity had risen to rectify market 
disequilibria.  Although the consequences of these price rises were all the same, the 
reasons for the price rises differed, and respondents made very clear distinctions between 
the firms’ actions in terms of perceived fairness.  In particular, price rises due to supply 
changes were “fair”, but equivalent rises due to increased demand were “unfair”.  Bies et 
al. (1993) developed this issue further and found that procedural justice was an important 
determinant of perceived fairness.  For example, the degree to which firms involve 
workers in discussions about pay cuts substantially affected the perceived fairness of 
those cuts.  Frey and Pommerehne (1993) conducted a similar study with German and 
Swiss populations and found that raising prices to ration demand was considered less fair 
than allocation by a “first come, first served” rule or allocation by an authority. 
 
Further empirical work into procedural preferences in economic contexts has been 
conducted (notably by Bruno Frey and colleagues) in a number of decision-making 
scenarios, focusing in particular on the decision of where to site environmental hazards 
such as toxic waste dumps and radioactive waste facilities.  Pommerehne et al. (1997) 
compare alternative allocative mechanisms and find that expert judgement is considered 
acceptable by over half their sample, ahead of (and in descending order of preference) 
layperson judgement, allocation by lottery, and an auction mechanism.  Frey and 
Oberholzer-Gee (1996) find that solutions using monetary values (based on willingness 
to pay or willingness to accept) to determine the location of sites are the least acceptable 
of all the solutions they consider.  Frey et al. (1996) argue that the poor performance of 
solutions relying on compensation is because 1) compensation is regarded as a form of 
bribe (that is, a system using compensation is seen to be morally wrong), and 2) 
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compensation is typically inconsistent with a public spirited acceptance of an unwanted 
facility (that is, offering compensation “crowds-out” public spiritedness). 
 
Yet despite these studies, our understanding of procedural justice in economic contexts 
and the relevance of the concept to policy-makers remains limited.  In particular, while 
procedural justice captures a number of different procedural characteristics (such as 
consistency, transparency, and so on), we have very little idea about which of these 
characteristics matter most to people and what relationships there might be between 
them.  By taking note of the relative importance of different procedural characteristics, 
decision makers would be able to adjust their existing procedures to increase the chances 
that individuals will support even apparently unfavourable decisions.  The different 
procedural characteristics have been discussed at some length in social psychology and 
legal studies (see, for example, the seminal works of Thibaut and Walker 1975, Lind and 
Tyler 1988) but there has been very little empirical work on the relative importance 
attached to the different procedures.   
 
In addition, this literature typically deals with decision-making at an individual level. 
Whilst procedural preferences have been discussed at the societal level, for example, 
Daniels and Sabin (1997 and 1998) in the context of health care, empirical evidence at 
this level is relatively scarce.  Of the papers testing procedures at the societal level, 
Wailoo and Anand (2005) established the significance of procedures similar to those 
below, although they make no claims as to their relative importance (see also papers by 
Aquino et al. 1992 and Syme and Fenton 1993).  
 
This paper has three main aims.  The first is to consider whether the same set of 
procedural characteristics that have been identified as important in the fields of social 
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psychology and legal studies are also important in a social choice context.  The second is 
to provide tentative evidence on the relative importance attached to the different 
characteristics.  The third aim of this paper is to consider the reasons why some 
procedural characteristics matter.   
 
Here, we distinguish between three reasons: first, procedures might matter simply 
because they promote better outcomes (a narrow consequentialist view corresponding to 
the traditional welfare economics approach); second, they might matter because they 
have inherent value in their own right (a pure proceduralist view); third, they may be 
important because they promote factors other than consequences that individuals value 
(a non-consequential, instrumental view).  Any particular procedural characteristic may 
be justified using a combination of these three reasons.  For example, a decision-making 
mechanism that consults with members of the general public may be preferred because 
members of the local community know best about what is needed, so consulting them 
will lead to best outcomes; or because democracy means consulting constituent voting 
public regardless of how it contributes to the decision itself; and/or because consultation 
conveys respect from the decision maker. 
 
A literature review and three studies were conducted.  The review highlights the specific 
characteristics of decision-making that have been examined (and shown to be important) 
in individual, organisational and social decision-making contexts, and also considers 
those studies that have assessed the relative importance of different procedural 
characteristics.  The review forms the basis for the empirical studies that test the 
relevance of these procedural characteristics in the context of health care rationing, 
which serves as an example of a social choice problem.  In what follows, Section 2 
discusses the characteristics of procedural justice that were identified from the literature 
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review, Section 3 outlines the study methods, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 
5 provides some discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The importance of different procedural characteristics 
 
A systematic literature review was conducted in order to identify and classify potentially 
relevant procedural characteristics.  To identify relevant publications, we used keyword 
searches of electronic databases and hand searches of specific journals and papers by 
specific authors.  Full details of the review are available from the authors on request.  A 
total of 107 potentially useful articles and books were identified from across a range of 
decision-making contexts.  Most works referred to scenarios within legal or 
organisational settings (which include areas such as dispute resolution, performance 
appraisal, pay determination, and hiring decisions) rather than social choice scenarios.  
Across these contexts, the theoretical literature on procedural justice can be summarised 
using six broad procedural characteristics: voice, neutrality, consistency, accuracy, 
reversibility and transparency. 
 
2.1 The procedural characteristics 
 
Voice refers to the means by which those who are affected or potentially affected by a 
decision have the opportunity to contribute to the decision making process.  This may 
either be directly or via some type of representation, a distinction that Anand (2001) 
refers to as macro versus micro voice.  Furthermore, the type of involvement in the 
decision making process may take the form of information giving, as in the right of a 
defendant to give evidence in courtroom trials, or may extend to some involvement in 
the actual process of making decisions, as in the inclusion of public or patient 
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representatives on health care decision making bodies.  A total of 46 out of the 107 
papers empirically investigated at least one element of voice, and 44 of these found some 
evidence in support of it. 
 
Regardless of the degree to which those affected by decisions are included in the 
process, neutrality requires that decision-makers are able to separate themselves from 
preconceptions and self-interest (Magner et al. 2000).  Variants of neutrality exist that 
focus on the trust placed in decision-makers and a belief in their honesty.  Perhaps the 
most obvious example of this type of bias suppression is the requirement for 
declarations of interest operated by many academic journals and decision-making 
committees, although these tend to focus on potential vested interests that arise from 
pecuniary rewards.  Fifteen papers specifically tested some form of neutrality, and in 
each case an element of this characteristic was supported. 
 
Whilst neutrality may require that the interests of similar people within a process be 
treated in the same way, there is still potential for individuals to be afforded different 
roles within the process.  For a process to satisfy consistency, however, the roles 
accorded to similar people ( including the degree to which they may make 
representations to the decision-maker) must also be the same (Leventhal 1980).  In 
addition, procedural consistency may be thought of as the requirement that the same 
decision making criteria are applied across both a significant time period and across a 
range of comparable decision contexts. Eight papers elicited preferences over 
consistency, and five of these found support for this procedural characteristic.   
 
Any decision-making process requires some mechanism for assessing the relevance and 
accuracy of different types of information.  In conjunction with neutrality and 
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consistency, the use of accurate information leads to decisions being made on the basis 
of evidence rather than personal bias or other vagaries of the decision-making process.  
As the parties to a dispute or the opinions of the general public form a potential source 
of information on which decisions could be made, there will be some overlap with voice.  
In particular, within contexts such as job selection and legal disputes, the parties 
concerned will hold some of the most pertinent information to the decision.  Accuracy 
therefore refers to both the fitness for use of the information that informs decision 
makers and the competencies of those responsible for making the decisions.  Accuracy 
was tested in twelve papers, eleven of which found support for some aspect of it. 
 
On procedural justice grounds, a group facing an unfavourable outcome can be argued 
to have a right to appeal an unfavourable decision (within certain restrictions, such as 
where due process was violated or where new facts became available) and this requires 
some degree of reversibility of the decision.  Where these arguments are seen to be 
convincing, it is reasonable that a decision may be reversed or compensation awarded 
when this is not possible.  The effect of reversibility procedures is to govern the 
restrictions on when claims can be made and how appeals will proceed.  Overall, 
reversibility was tested in five studies and found to be significant in four of them.  
 
The final procedural characteristic identified was transparency.  At the individual level (in 
legal settings, for example, where a person is intimately involved in the process), it is 
relatively hard to deny affected parties information that was relevant to how the decision 
was made.  In social decision-making contexts, however, there is no guarantee that it will 
be clear how a decision was reached.  Where information about the process is lacking, 
the ability of a person to see what procedures are in use and whether procedural rules 
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were followed is hampered.  Transparency was tested in five papers, with a form of it 
found to be important in two.  
 
2.2 The relative importance of the procedural characteristics 
 
Since Leventhal (1980) noted the lack of empirical evidence about the relative 
importance of different sets of procedural characteristics, only fourteen studies were 
identified in the review as providing data on more than one of the procedural 
characteristics.1  Although each of these studies considered two or more procedures, 
none could provide information on trade-offs.  The statistical tests precluded trade-offs 
being found (for example, Hartman et al. 1999), or the methodology was unclear (for 
example, Tyler 1994), or inappropriate methodologies were used for the categorical data 
(for example, Truxillo et al. 2001).  
 
For these reasons, we were not able to draw any firm conclusions from the existing 
literature about the relative importance of different procedures.  Moreover, it should be 
noted that studies have described the different procedural characteristics in a variety of 
ways.  The relative importance of procedural characteristics, like the importance of many 
other things in life, is likely to be highly context-specific, and we should be very cautious 
about drawing inferences for social level decision-making from the results of studies that 
have looked at individual level decision-making.  Finally, decision-making bodies cannot 
assess the importance of procedural preferences until the reasons why these procedures 
are important are better understood.   
 
                                                 
1  Typical examples were pay and promotion awards (Jones et al. 1999) and reactions to the editorial 
decisions of publishers (Gilliland and Beckstein 1996). 
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2.3 Why procedural characteristics might matter  
 
To understand better the role that procedures might play in decision-making, we need to 
know whether procedures are valued for their effects on consequences, on other factors, 
or simply in their own right.  The distinction is important for economists whose outcome 
oriented viewpoint may be challenged either for its failure to address deontological 
considerations or for being too narrow a version of consequentialism.  Where procedures 
generate no intrinsic value, but can be expressed solely in terms of their impact on 
outcomes, they have no direct importance for assessments of social welfare.  In other 
situations, where procedures are valued either for their impact on non consequential 
factors or are viewed as inherently valuable in themselves, then social welfare cannot be 
assessed without reference to procedure. Currently, there exists little evidence in this 
regard.  
 
There is clearly instrumental value to voice in that it allows a degree of control over 
decision-making, or at least gives the impression of control (Thibaut and Walker 1975, 
1978).  Using a legal dispute setting, Thibaut and Walker (1975) distinguish between 
control over the final decision (decision control) and control over the presentation of 
evidence (process control).  In addition, it has been argued that voice generates value 
through the impact on dignity and social standing (for example, Tyler and Lind 1992, 
Tyler et al. 1996, Jones et al. 1999); that is, it generates values for reasons beyond those 
captured in a consequentialist framework.  Furthermore, the ‘value-expressive’ aspect of 
voice refers to the inherent value that people ascribe to the ability to state their case, 
irrespective of the impact that this may have on the actual decision (Tyler et al. 1985). 
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Despite the recognition of the importance of neutrality, no study that we are aware of 
has distinguished between inherent and instrumental value, or between consequential or 
non-consequential importance.  The pure procedural view of consistency is that a 
decision might be seen as unfair when evaluated according to its consequences alone 
(perhaps because of its distributional consequences) but might nonetheless be seen as fair 
overall if it can be demonstrated that procedures have been applied in a consistent 
manner.  Individuals could also see procedural consistency as a means of promoting 
decisions (and resultant consequences) that are themselves more consistent across 
persons and over time. 
 
The extent to which information used in decision-making is accurate and up-to-date has 
a clear and direct instrumental value in promoting better outcomes.  However, there may 
be additional value associated with this procedural characteristic in that the investment in 
gathering more accurate information in the first place signifies that making the ‘right’ 
decision matters, which thus conveys respect for those potentially affected by those 
decisions.  Again, no evidence was found that tested the importance of the distinction 
between instrumental and non-instrumental reasons for valuing increased accuracy.   
 
Decision-making mechanisms that incorporate some element of appeal and reversibility 
of decisions have clear benefits in terms of promoting better outcomes provided that the 
mechanisms that led to the initial decision are in some way imperfect and the appeal 
mechanism employs different criteria or additional information. There is, however, a 
recognised requirement for the provision of appeal in legal scenarios in situations where 
procedural rules have been violated, for example, the ability to appeal “on a technicality”, 
which implies that reversibility is not solely valued for consequential purposes.  In this 
situation, reversibility is dependent on other characteristics of the decision process. 
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Furthermore, individuals may value appeals not only for their ability to lead to better 
outcomes on average, but also for the opportunity they provide for their voice to be 
heard and for their function in providing a forum in which any disagreement with the 
decision can be formally registered.  
 
The instrumental importance of transparency is likely to be related to the need for 
reversibility in a decision making process. Transparency allows individuals not 
responsible for decision making to scrutinize the information and logic applied to that 
information. This in turn allows those external to decision making to assess the outcome 
of that process and launch appeals where the decision itself is considered “incorrect”. In 
addition to this instrumental and consequential value, transparency is required in order to 
assess whether the procedural rules of decision-making have been adhered to, which may 
in turn be a cause for appeal.  
 
Evidence of how these different procedural characteristics impact upon assessments of 
decision making in social choice scenarios is limited, as is evidence of how these 
assessments are related to concerns for the eventual outcomes of the decisions.  Further 
empirical investigation is therefore required in order to locate existing evidence from 
psychology and legal studies in a wider context that can ultimately inform institutional 
design and other elements of public policy.  In the following section, we describe three 
studies that attempt to provide such evidence using the issue of health care rationing as 
an example of social choice. 
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3.  Study methods 
 
One set of focus group discussions and two questionnaires were used in order to 
investigate which procedures matter, how much they matter relative to one another, and 
why they matter, within the context of social decision-making.  The focus groups looked 
at which procedural characteristics matter, the first questionnaire looked at the relative 
importance of the procedural characteristics, and the second questionnaire looked at 
whether procedural characteristics are valued for their instrumental or inherent value.   
 
All the studies focused on a health care rationing decision as an example of a social 
choice problem.  The issue of how best to use scarce health care resources is one that 
faces all health systems.  Whilst a number of contributions have been made to identify 
the importance of both efficiency and equity-based consequentialist criteria for making 
such decisions (see Dolan and Olsen 2002), it is not clear that any contentious decision, 
particularly one that may involve the denial of health care to particular individuals, will 
be acceptable to the public unless the public is satisfied that the procedures used to make 
such tough decisions have been fair (Wailoo and Anand). 
  
The focus groups gave participants the opportunity to discuss, justify, reflect upon and 
amend their opinions about how planning decisions should be undertaken.  A sample of 
the general public in Sheffield, UK, was invited by letter to attend focus group 
discussions for which they were offered a small amount of money.  Eight groups were 
held involving 54 participants.  A facilitator, who first described a health care rationing 
scenario to them, led each group.  The scenario described was that of a UK National 
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Health Service (NHS) health authority that experienced an unexpected change in its 
budget mid-way through a financial year.2   
 
In half of the groups, the scenario described an unexpected budget increase, whilst in the 
other half this was a budget decrease.  This distinction was made to control for the fact 
that preferences may differ in response to social gains as opposed to losses in the same 
way as individual preferences have been found to (Rabin 1998).  Participants were asked 
to discuss the means by which they would make the necessary funding decisions.  
Intervention from facilitators from this point was minimised. Clarifications were given 
where required, but the primary role of the facilitator was to steer discussions back to the 
issue in question where they diverged.  Discussions were transcribed and analysed by two 
researchers by coding text into categories based on the procedural characteristics 
identified from the literature review.    
  
The first questionnaire was administered on a different sample of the general public, also 
from Sheffield, UK.  These individuals were invited by letter to attend discussions about 
more general priority-setting issues in health care (not discussed in this paper; Tsuchiya et 
al. 2005), for which they were offered a small amount of money.  A sample of 128 people 
attended a total of 24 focus group discussions.  At the end of these groups, respondents 
were briefed about what was required of them in relation to this study, which included a 
brief definition of each of the six procedural characteristics and a description of the UK’s 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE).3  In total, 87 (68%) responses were 
received.  
                                                 
2 This type of organisation has responsibility for the health care needs of a regional population 
(approximately 500,000 people in our example). 
3 NICE was set up in the UK NHS in England and Wales in April 1999 “to provide patients, health 
professionals and the public with authoritative, robust and reliable guidance on current best practice” (see 
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The question (reproduced in Appendix 14) asked respondents to express their 
preferences on the relative importance of the six procedural characteristics.  The question 
specified (entirely hypothetically) that NICE currently performs at a medium level (on a 
high-medium-low scale) on each procedural characteristic.5  The question then asked 
which characteristic the respondent would choose to improve should additional 
resources be made available.  Each respondent was then asked to choose his or her 
second choice, third choice, and so on.  This exercise produced a ranking of the six 
characteristics.  The data were summarised using Borda scores and the Thurstone 
indices.6  Both Borda scores and the Thurstone indices represent the degree by which a 
given characteristic is preferred over another in cardinal terms.  While neither is a perfect 
measure of aggregated rank order data, agreement between them offers insight regarding 
the robustness of the results given their different theoretical foundations. 
 
The second questionnaire was initially administered on the participants in the focus 
groups of the first study (with 49 out of 54 completed responses). In order to increase 
sample size, an additional 48 respondents were recruited from university students.7  
These participants were provided with background material similar to that discussed in 
                                                                                                                                            
www.nice.org.uk).  In 2005, this body was succeeded by the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence, which retained the acronym. 
4 Available on JEBO website 
5 It was necessary to specify the current state (medium for all characteristics) because without this 
information, individuals may choose based on their (unobserved) preconceptions about its performance, 
which would make interpreting the results problematic.  For example, if a respondent felt that NICE was 
performing well on characteristic X and poorly on characteristic Y, she may be more likely to rank Y above 
X even if characteristic X is considered more important.  
6 Borda scores for a characteristic is based on the ranking given to it by each respondent.  If it is ranked 
first by one respondent, this counts as a score of 6, if ranked second by two respondents, then this counts 
as a score of 5 × 2 = 10, and so on.  The average Borda score for each characteristic is then calculated 
across respondents.  Thurstone index for a characteristic is derived from the proportion of times it is 
ranked higher than all the other characteristics.  A normal distribution is assumed and the probabilities 
transformed into z-values, which gives the Thurstone index.  We report both scores that are standardised 
between 0 and 1, between the most and least preferred procedural characteristics, respectively.  
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the focus groups.  All respondents answered three questions (reproduced in Appendix 2) 
designed to highlight the distinction between the narrow consequentialist and procedural 
viewpoints.   
 
4.  Results  
 
4.1.  Do procedural characteristics matter?  
 
Table 1 reports the numbers of focus groups that discussed each of six procedural 
characteristics without prompting from the facilitator.  On average, each group raised 
three procedural characteristics, but substantial differences were noted in the frequency 
with which each characteristic was discussed.  Voice and accuracy were discussed most 
frequently (six out of eight groups), whereas consistency was mentioned in only one of 
the groups.  Participants who initially raised particular procedural characteristics did so in 
a positive manner; that is, they referred to particular ways in which decision-making 
ought to proceed.  Subsequent contributions from other participants were not always 
positive. Participants sought to justify these attitudes in discussions and, in so doing, 
drew on broader consequentialist and purely procedural arguments. 
 
Discussions relating to the concept of voice suggested strong support for consultation 
with members of the public as a general principle.  Some respondents expressed 
misgivings about specific types of consultation, but none expressed negative opinions 
about voice per se.  In some cases, the general public were seen as a valuable information 
source for the NHS to identify needs and to reflect public preferences.  This was 
                                                                                                                                            
7 All analyses included comparisons of the results from the two subsamples but no significant differences 
were found. 
Page 17 of 33 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 18
particularly the case where respondents recognised that rationing decisions entail value 
judgements and felt that, as taxpayers, their own values judgements were important.  In 
addition, several respondents felt that public involvement in decision-making was a right, 
often closely associated with a notion of citizenship or democracy: 
#3, Group 1: I think it would be worth spending that money [on consultation], 
because that is the whole point of having a democracy. 
 
All groups expressed either prompted or unprompted concerns about neutrality and the 
involvement of those with vested interests in decision-making.  This recognition 
extended to members of the general public: 
#8, G2: Everybody has something to say about it and has a vested interest in it. 
 
It was often argued that neutrality would be achieved by involving several 
representatives whose biases offset each other.  Additionally, it was recognised 
that a range of professionals might have potential vested interests but that other 
procedural characteristics, in particular transparency, could prevent this from 
causing a problem. 
 
As the question posed to the focus groups considered a one-off decision to be made 
now, it is not surprising that discussions relating to consistency focused on regional 
rather than temporal issues.  Procedural consistency (consistency of the decision making 
process across locations) arose in six of the discussions and the potential conflict with 
geographic consistency (consistency of the conclusion across locations) featured 
prominently, with a number of individuals expressing a clear willingness to accept 
variations in outcomes in favour of the application of consistent procedural rules: 
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#11, G3: I would have thought that people would be more comfortable in general 
with it if they used the same way to come to the conclusion of which treatment to 
use.  They might not like that way, but I think they would see it as being a fair 
decision.   
 
In most groups, individuals discussed the types of information they would seek in order 
to inform decision-making, and some advocated that steps be taken to ensure the 
accuracy of information used in the decision.  For example, the commissioning of 
primary research and international comparisons were suggested.  Interestingly, some 
individuals identified the opportunity cost of allocating resources towards finding 
increasingly accurate information in terms of both resources and delay: 
#7, G4: See what you don't want to end up with is all the money being spent on you 
know, these decisions, you know the research, blah blah blah, to get to the decisions.   
 
A similar recognition was apparent from some responses discussing the appropriate 
extent of reversibility, with the view expressed that the value of allowing challenges to 
decisions may depend on whether other procedural and distributional rules have been 
adhered to: 
#24, G5:  Yes.  The important thing is to get the process right.  And if you've 
got the process right - you can only work that way.  Get the process as good as you 
can, and then you make the decision.  And that's the decision.  I mean you're 
paralysed if the decision can keep being appealed. 
 
Finally, the transparency of the decision making process was seen to encourage the 
satisfaction of other procedural rules, particularly in the scrutiny of the information used 
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to make decisions (accuracy).  Transparency also promotes the acceptance of decisions 
that might be less acceptable if evaluated solely in terms of consequences:   
#7, G2: I think that if people have an adequate explanation for why something's 
like that then they don't feel, like we said before, they don't feel cheated.  They 
don't feel like they're being denied something. 
 
4.2. Which procedural characteristics matter most? 
 
Table 2 (adapted from Tsuchiya et al.) reports the number of respondents in the first 
survey that selected each procedural characteristic as the most important, alongside the 
Borda scores and Thurstone indices from the ranking exercise.  The rank ordering of the 
Borda scores and Thurstone indices are identical, and since they are derived from 
different sets of assumptions, this suggests the robustness of this ranking (also note the 
high product moment correlation of the two standardised scores).  It can be seen that 
accuracy and consistency are the most important procedures, with transparency viewed 
as the least important procedure.  The importance attached to consistency in this study is 
seemingly greater than in the focus group discussions, which may reflect the different 
decision making settings for the two studies.  The survey questions were set at a national 
level in the context of an institution that has the elimination of regional variation as one 
of its primary aims.  The two sets of results may not therefore be contradictory since 
failure to raise an issue unprompted is not synonymous with believing it to be less 
important.     
 
4.3. Why do procedural characteristics matter? 
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses to statements in the second questionnaire.  
Responses to negatively worded questions have been reversed, so that “disagree 
strongly” represents a purely consequentialist viewpoint.  As the degree of “agreement” 
in the responses increases, the degree of non-consequential value also increases.  The 
responses indicate that relatively few people assign a purely consequentialist value to 
procedures, with less than 20% of respondents indicating this in each of the three 
questions.   
 
5.  Discussion 
 
Standard economic theory operates on a narrow consequentialist foundation that has 
little to say about alternative mechanisms for decision-making.  However, literature from 
a range of other disciplines, notably social psychology nd legal studies, has provided 
substantial empirical evidence that suggests individuals have preferences for the 
characteristics of allocation mechanisms in a wide variety of areas, such as pay and 
promotion awards, arbitration decisions and court room verdicts and sentences.  While 
there are some exceptions, most notably the theoretical work of Sen and the empirical 
work of Frey and colleagues, most economic research has ignored the role of procedures 
and procedural justice.  One key contribution of this paper has been to identify whether 
narrow consequentialism is limited by this exclusion and, if so, the extent to which 
procedural preferences can still be accounted for within a broader consequentialist 
framework.  
 
Existing literature on procedural justice refers to six main procedural characteristics that 
have also been found to be important in individual decision-making contexts.  In this 
paper, we report on studies that have elicited procedural preferences in the context of 
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health care priority setting.  The results from focus group discussions suggest that the six 
characteristics are of concern to participants in that all characteristics were raised in at 
least one of the eight focus groups without any prompting from the facilitator.  The 
frequency with which these characteristics were raised provides some indication of the 
relative importance of each characteristic.  The first survey asked individuals to rank 
these characteristics directly.  In both cases, the accuracy of information used in 
decision-making is found to be one of the most important characteristics, and relatively 
little importance is attached to reversibility.   
 
However, there are also apparent inconsistencies between the two tudies;  focus group 
discussants rarely raised the issue of procedural consistency whereas survey respondents 
ranked this relatively highly.  The opposite was observed in relation to transparency. 
These findings may indicate that the importance attached to procedural characteristics is 
not only sensitive to individual versus social choices, but also highly context specific.  
Health care rationing decisions at the regional level (the subject of the focus group 
discussions) might not be evaluated by the same procedural characteristics as those made 
at a national level (the subject of the first survey).  This possibility is something that 
should be explored in future empirical research. 
 
The importance of procedures in social choice settings depends critically on the reasons 
why individuals value alternative decision-making mechanisms.  If procedures have only 
consequential instrumental value, as the narrow version of welfare economics implicitly 
assumes, then procedures themselves do not directly impact upon well-being.  Of 
course, the use of appropriate decision-making mechanisms will ensure that the 
consequences of health care rationing decisions will improve, and for some respondents 
to the second survey, this is the only purpose of considering procedures.  But for 
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substantial proportions of respondents this only partially describes procedural 
preferences.  The extent to which narrow consequentialism, or consequentialism per se, 
must be considered insufficient varies even within the health care rationing scenario 
depending on how questions are asked, between attitudes to procedures as a class and 
between individual procedural characteristics.  In all three questions that relate to Figure 
1, simple instrumental consequentialism does not provide a description of the 
preferences of a substantial proportion of respondents.  Interestingly, where the question 
refers directly to fairness, the importance of procedures is even greater, indicating that 
consequentialism per se may not be able to capture procedural preferences.  
 
Despite caution over the generalisability of results, the central tenet remains: health care 
outcomes may not be the sole basis on which prioritisation decisions should be based. 
The data represent a modest start to our understanding of why people care about the 
way in which decisions are made, as well as about the consequences of those decisions. 
Of course, it is possible that, if pushed on the reasons for their responses in this study, 
respondents may ultimately value procedures for their effects on some outcome or 
other. In a similar way, people have been shown to value health, social relationships, and 
so on for their consequent effects on happiness, despite first appearances to the contrary 
(Bagozzi and Edwards 1998). 
 
For instance, it is plausible that an individual values involvement in a decision 
irrespective of whether the decision changes in that instance.  Whether an approach that 
incorporates procedures as well as narrow consequences should be labelled 
consequentialist or not is a question we do not seek to resolve here.  Conceptually, it 
may be possible for a broader version of welfare economics to capture some of these 
concerns, but it is important that, in so doing, the individual utilities that go into a 
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welfarist social welfare function retain their conceptual clarity.  From an empirical point 
of the view, the real challenge is to identify the set of non-consequentialist reasons that 
procedures are valued for, and the studies reported here do not go particularly far in this. 
 
The results from the studies reported here must be considered in the light of several 
other caveats. Firstly, health care rationing is an issue that is alien to most members of 
the general public, and the concept of procedural preferences is further remote.  Surveys 
and focus group discussions were designed to provide accurate explanations of these 
concepts to participants but were inevitably simplistic and may not have been well 
understood by all participants.  Secondly, the decision contexts focused on a one-off 
decision, where it is conceivable that the importance of consistency or reversibility may 
be less than in other on-going decision making scenarios.  Thirdly, whilst there are 
inevitable relationships between procedures and consequences, the empirical element of 
this paper has little to say about this.  An additional simplification was that no 
relationship between procedural characteristics was introduced.  A clear challenge for the 
incorporation of procedural considerations into the assessment of social welfare, and the 
design and operation of decision-making institutions, is to account for these 
relationships.  
 
Despite such caveats, the findings presented here provide further challenge to economic 
theory that focuses only on a narrowly defined set of consequences.  We contend, as this 
evidence shows, that there is an important research agenda to be developed concerning 
the fact that we evaluate procedures alongside consequences.  In addition to challenging 
our exclusive bias towards evaluation-by-outcome, procedural justice may further 
challenge key assumptions in economics.  Current versions of welfare economics do not 
fully explain the way we view macro level institutions who choose on our behalf and 
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whose decisions may have a substantial impact upon us.  Outcomes are important, but 
procedures also play a key role in the way human beings reconcile aims against resources.  
As welfare economics typically takes consumer sovereignty to hold, we are left with a 
choice: either we look to incorporate procedural concerns into standard welfare 
economic theory, or we ignore procedural concerns and risk overlooking an important 
source of utility.  If we choose not to exclude procedural preferences, we need further 
evidence as to the relative importance of procedures, with an aim to find eventually 
trade-offs between individual procedures and outcomes that will result in better social 
decision making.
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Table 1: Focus groups: unprompted discussion of procedural characteristics 
 
 Voice Neutrality Consistency Accuracy Reversibility Transparency Total (characteristics 
per group) 
Group 1 * *  * *  4 
Group 2  *     1 
Group 3 *  * *  * 4 
Group 4  *  *  * 3 
Group 5 *   *   2 
Group 6 *   * *  3 
Group 7 *   * * * 4 
Group 8 * *    * 3 
Total (groups per 
characteristic)  
6 4 1 6 3 4  
 
 
 
Table 2: Responses to questionnaire 1: the relative importance of characteristics 
 
 
 
 First choice            Scores 
 n % Borda (stand.) 
Thurstone 
(stand.) 
common 
ranking 
Voice 17 20.2 0.52 0.51 3 
Neutrality 7 8.3 0.38 0.37 4 
Consistency 17 20.2 0.69 0.67 2 
Accuracy 37 44.0 1.00 1.00 1 
Reversibility 4 4.8 0.25 0.25 5 
Transparency 2 2.4 0.00 0.00 6 
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Figure 1: Responses to questionnaire 2: agreement to statements suggesting that 
procedures have non-consequential value 
 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Agree strongly (%) Agree to some extent (%) Neither agree nor disagree (%)
Disagree to some extent (%) Disagree strongly (%)  
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire 18. 
 
 
NICE’s performance in each procedure can be classified as ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’. 
Let us assume that NICE is at a medium level in all these six procedures: 
 
  low medium high 
Accuracy   X  
Consistency   X  
Impartiality   X  
Reversibility   X  
Transparency   X  
Voice    X  
 
 
Imagine that some extra funds are available to change the performance of NICE in 
one of those six procedures. Bearing in mind that the costs of doing it are the same for 
all procedures, which one would you choose? Please place a ‘1’ in the box next to 
your choice (in the table below). 
 
Accuracy   
Consistency   
Impartiality   
Reversibility   
Transparency   
Voice    
 
 
Now imagine that even more resources are available and that you would be given the 
chance to choose another procedure in which you would like to change NICE’s 
performance. Which one would you choose? Please place a ‘2’ in the box next to it. 
 
Please repeat the process until you have numbered all choices from ‘1’ to ‘6’. 
 
If you are not happy with the final order please change it. 
                                                 
8 Taken from Tsuchiya et al. 2005 
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire 2 
 
 
In situations where allocation 
decisions are discussed: 
agree 
strongly 
agree  
to some 
extent 
neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
disagree 
to some 
extent 
disagree 
strongly 
 “If the decisions made are seen to 
be acceptable, then the ways in 
which those decisions were made 
do not matter very much.” 
a b c d e 
“If the final decisions made are 
going to be the same, it doesn’t 
matter very much how these 
decisions were reached.” 
a b c d e 
 “So long as the rules for making 
decisions are fair, then the resulting 
decisions are bound to be fair.” 
a b c d e 
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